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GROUP-CONFLICT RESOLUTION: 
SOURCES OF RESISTANCE TO 
RECONCILIATION 
ERIN ANN O’HARA* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
In the past few years a number of scholars in a variety of intellectual 
disciplines have contributed to a better understanding of dyadic conflicts and 
their resolution. In particular, sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, 
lawyers, and others have explored the dynamics of apology and its role in 
deescalating disputes and promoting forgiveness and reconciliation.1 
Furthermore, we have a better understanding today of the benefits to 
individuals from forgiveness and reconciliation. Victims who are able to forgive 
their transgressors have better psychological and physical health and lead richer 
lives.2 Because lawyers tend to focus their attentions on legal disputes, a 
growing body of legal scholarship attempts to apply these insights to help 
promote apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation in courts and alternative 
dispute-resolution fora.3 This scholarship has in turn provoked a debate among 
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 1. The literature on apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation is vast and growing. Some very useful 
articles, books, and book chapters include NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF 
APOLOGY AND RECONCILIATION 26 (1991); Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1009 (1999); Bruce W. Darby & Barry R. Schlenker, Children’s Reactions to 
Transgressions: Effects of the Actor’s Apology, Reputation and Remorse, 28 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 353 
(1989); Robert D. Enright & Bruce A. Kittle, Forgiveness in Psychology and Law: The Meeting of 
Moral Development and Restorative Justice, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1621, 1623 (2000); Letitia Hickson, 
The Social Contexts of Apology in Dispute Settlement: A Cross-Cultural Study, 25 ETHNOLOGY 283 
(1986); Erin Ann O’Hara & Douglas Yarn, On Apology and Consilience, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1121 
(2002); Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135 (2000); 
Bernard Weiner et al., Public Confession and Forgiveness, 59 J. PERSONALITY 281 (1991); Elizabeth 
Latif, Note, Apologetic Justice: Evaluating Apologies Tailored Toward Legal Solutions, 81 B.U. L. REV. 
289 (2001); Deborah L. Levi, Note, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 (1997). 
 2. See Stephen P. Garvey, Restorative Justice, Punishment, and Atonement, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 
303, 315 & n.42 (noting possible health benefits from forgiveness); Frans B.M. de Wall, Evolutionary 
Ethics, Aggression, and Violence: Lessons from Primate Research, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 18 (2004) 
(noting that some studies indicate that forgiveness produces health benefits). 
 3. See, e.g., law-review articles cited supra note 1. 
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legal scholars regarding the proper use of apology and apology-promoting tools 
in the context of legal disputes.4 
The early legal scholarship in this field focused on dyadic disputes. More 
recently, however, legal scholars have applied the interdisciplinary insights to 
group conflicts. In the area of apology, for example, one legal scholar has relied 
on interdisciplinary insights to advocate court-ordered apologies as a civil-rights 
remedy in cases of civil-rights violations committed against groups of 
individuals.5 Similar insights were used to explore the role of apology for 
helping to resolve international conflicts between states.6 One author uses these 
insights to advocate that corporations apologize for product defects and 
accidents that cause public harm.7 And another scholar has used the insights to 
argue that the American Bar Association should apologize and make 
reparations for its prior exclusion of African American lawyers.8 Although this 
development is exciting (after all, who wouldn’t like to see group conflicts and 
civil unrest avoided), most legal scholars have failed to think carefully about 
potential differences between dyadic and group conflicts and their resolution. 
To what extent can insights from apology and forgiveness in dyadic disputes be 
imported into the group-conflict context? How might differences between the 
two types of disputes necessitate differing dispute-resolution techniques? And 
specifically, how is disputant resistance to conflict resolution changed or 
amplified in the group-conflict context? A group of legal scholars at Vanderbilt 
Law School, affiliated with the Law and Human Behavior Program, wanted to 
bring together an interdisciplinary group of scholars whose expertise lies in and 
around conflict resolution to explore this question. 
We partnered with the Andrus Family Fund, which generously provided us 
with the necessary funding to host this conference. The Andrus Family Fund 
has provided funding to a number of conflict-resolution practitioners who have 
played important roles in promoting peace, reconciliation, and problem 
resolution to groups around the world.9 Some of the techniques used by the 
Fund grantees are adapted from the work of William Bridges,10 who developed 
 
 4. For example, compare Taft, supra note 1 (arguing that apology should play no role in law or it 
will be used strategically), with Cohen, supra note 1 (arguing that legal reforms should be put in place 
to promote apology by wrongdoers). 
 5. Brent T. White, Say You’re Sorry: Court-Ordered Apologies as a Civil Rights Remedy, 91 
CORNELL L. REV. 1261 (2006). 
 6. Richard B. Bilder, The Role of Apology in International Law and Diplomacy, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 
433 (2006). 
 7. Taryn Fuchs-Burnett, Mass Public Corporate Apology, DISP. RES. J., May–July 2002, at 26. 
 8. Adjoa Artis Aiyetoro, Truth Matters: A Call for the American Bar Association to Acknowledge 
Its Past and Make Reparations to African Descendents, 18 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 51 (2007). 
 9. See, e.g., Andrus Family Fund, Community Reconciliation Grantees, http://www.affund.org/ 
Community_Reconciliation.html (last visited July 31, 2009). 
 10. Andrus Family Fund, Transitions: Sustaining Social Change, http://www.transitionandsocial 
change.org/links.html (last visited July 31, 2009). 
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a conceptual framework for how people transition to changes that affect their 
lives in important ways.11 
The Bridges framework treats transitions in three phases. External changes 
often require internal psychological transitions, which involve “(1) an ending, 
(2) a neutral zone, and (3) a new beginning.”12 In the ending phase, the 
individual struggles to accept the end of an old way of being. Our connections 
to people and places, jobs, activities, ways of being, and attitudes help to define 
us, and the loss of any of these connections can cause not just mourning for the 
loss of that connection but also a kind of crisis of identity. Endings thus can be 
painful even when the change is desired.13 According to Bridges, ending 
experiences typically involve disengagement, dismantling, disidentification, 
disenchantment, and disorientation.14 In the neutral zone, the individual feels 
confused and anxious, because she does not yet know her new state of being. 
But in this stage the individual is able to be very creative and to conceive many 
possibilities for future courses of action.15 In the ending phase the individual 
adopts her new course of action or sense of self, or both, and reintegrates her 
new identity with the enduring elements of her old identity.16 Transitions are 
often aided by rituals set in place to mark the phases of transition and their 
significance to the individual.17 The Andrus Family Fund believes that conflicts 
throughout the world are often caused by or take on their own difficulties in 
responding to transition. Understanding the Transitions Framework and its 
implications for dealing with difficulties can significantly aid the process of 
promoting peace and reconciliation. 
In addition to providing the conference funding, the Andrus Family Fund 
was able to provide us with a connection to successful conflict-resolution 
practitioners who had thought a lot about the relationship between transition 
and conflict-resolution theory and practice. At the same time, the Fund was 
equally interested in the question of the extent to which work on individuals can 
be translated to the group-conflict context. Andrus Family Fund President 
Steve Kelban noted privately at the conference that the Fund had always 
proceeded under the assumption that learning about individuals could be 
applied to groups. But to what extent is this so, and how, if at all, should legal 
and social policies take into account differences? 
Of course, this is a huge question that cannot be resolved in a single 
conference. Many of the participants were addressing the question only 
 
 11. See generally WILLIAM BRIDGES, TRANSITIONS: MAKING SENSE OF LIFE’S CHANGES (2d ed. 
2004). 
 12. Id. at 4. 
 13. See id. at 11. 
 14. See id. at 109–23. 
 15. See id. at 133–55. 
 16. See id. at 169–74. 
 17. See id. at 101–05. 
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indirectly, and, like any good conference, we crafted as many questions and 
disagreements as we did seeds of understanding. Even so, conceptual progress 
was made at the conference, and the product of the individual scholars’ and 
practitioners’ thinking is provided in this issue. Before describing the basic 
thesis of each of the articles in this issue, let me elaborate on some of the 
insights regarding group-conflict resolution that were identified at the 
conference. 
II 
WHAT WE LEARNED 
First, many of the insights applicable to dyadic conflicts are also useful for 
group conflicts. Whether involving dyads or groups, conflicts involve humans 
who are experiencing predictable and powerful emotions. A wrongdoer, 
whether acting as individual or as part of a group, might resist acknowledging 
wrongdoing if (as is often the case) that acknowledgment produces feelings of 
shame and vulnerability. A victim, whether suffering as individual or as part of 
a group, can significantly benefit from apology, and apologies can set the stage 
for productive discussions regarding reparations and reconciliation. In all 
conflicts, regardless of type, reconciliation is easier after unintentional rather 
than intentional harms, and after minor rather than major harms. Timing of 
apology is critically important in both dyadic and group conflicts, as are the 
words chosen and the body language, tone of voice, and other details of the 
apologetic gesture. In both contexts effective apology can reduce the reparation 
demands, and enduring reconciliation is more likely when the victim is able to 
forgive. 
The group nature of conflicts complicates the conflict-resolution process, 
however. When individuals behave in a group frame, emotional biases, 
heuristics, and other tendencies that favor in-group members and disfavor out-
group members are much more likely to be present. Among other effects, these 
tendencies can result in individuals selectively attending to stimuli, assimilating 
information in a biased manner, and selectively remembering facts and events 
surrounding the conflict.18 Each of these factors can complicate dispute 
resolution. In addition, these tendencies can profoundly shape one’s attitude 
toward another, and in this case can cause fear, distrust, and hostility toward 
out-group members,19 making resistance to conflict resolution stronger in the 
context of group conflicts. When one experiences conflict with in-group 
members, feelings of distrust and hostility can sometimes be overcome by an 
offsetting need to preserve the benefits of an ongoing relationship, but no such 
 
 18. Roger Conner & Patricia Jordan, Never Being Able to Say You’re Sorry: Barriers to Apology by 
Leaders in Group Conflicts, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233 (Spring 2009). 
 19. Douglas H. Yarn & Gregory Todd Jones, A Biological Approach to Understanding Resistance 
to Apology, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation in Group Conflict, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (Spring 
2009). 
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pressure toward reconciliation is present when conflict involves out-group 
members.20 Moreover, group leaders know that loyalty to the group enhances 
the group’s cause, especially against powerful opponents, and group loyalty is 
facilitated through polarization, which is achieved by dehumanizing, blaming, 
and resenting opponents.21 
Authors Doug Yarn and Greg Jones suggest that out-group hostilities, or at 
least the differential assessment of in-group and out-group members, are 
biologically based.22 Terry Maroney notes that the idea is supported by 
psychological experiments showing that “both [blacks and whites] . . . acquire[] 
a stronger anticipatory fear response to [racial] out-group than to in-group 
faces, and both [groups] show[] a resistance to fear extinction only for out-
group faces.”23 If these biases are biologically based, then that suggests group 
conflicts might be even more resistant to reconciliation than are dyadic 
conflicts. 
Group conflicts and their resolution often involve public statements made 
on behalf of a group or directed toward another group. Public statements are 
dangerous mechanisms by which to attempt to air disagreements because, as 
Susan Bandes points out in the context of victim impact statements, such 
statements are very often ritualized and unnatural, and third-party victims and 
others often are unable to respond in a meaningful way.24 Moreover, any speech 
act that must cross racial, ethnic, or class boundaries (which is more likely for 
conflict with an out-group) risks misinterpretation by the communication’s 
target.25 
Even without these tendencies toward bias, hostility, and misinterpretation, 
group conflicts can be harder to resolve because each individual in a group must 
follow her own psychological journey through blame, anger (or guilt), 
acceptance, and, finally, peace. Several of the Andrus Family Fund grantees at 
the conference spoke of conflict resolution within William Bridges’ Transitions 
Framework. Recall that when one confronts change, such as a new job, divorce, 
personal tragedy, victimization, or cessation of hostilities, one must travel 
through three psychological stages: endings, neutral zone, and new beginnings.26 
In the endings stage, an individual feels a sense of loss for an old way of being. 
Even if the old way of being was painful or otherwise problematic, it often was 
familiar and contained known rules of conduct that facilitated a sense of 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Meghan Clarke, Polarization: The Role of Emotions in Reconciliation Efforts, 72 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 27 (Spring 2009). 
 22. Yarn & Jones, supra note 19. 
 23. Terry A. Maroney, Unlearning Fear of Out-Group Others, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 
(Spring 2009). 
 24. Susan A. Bandes, Victims, “Closure,” and the Sociology of Emotion, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 1 (Spring 2009). 
 25. See id. (discussing the misinterpretation problem in the context of victim impact statements). 
 26. See supra notes 12–17 and accompanying text. 
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comfort. The end point of the process, “new beginning,” is a state of comfort 
with the new state of being. But in between, in the neutral zone, lies anxiety and 
insecurity and a feeling of chaos from the uncertainty surrounding that new 
state. The neutral zone can be full of excitement and creativity because it 
involves rewriting history and forming a new identity. In the context of conflict, 
this stage also requires the individual to interact with people that she might 
prefer to avoid.27 
An individual’s progress through these three stages might depend on any 
number of factors, including the personality and disposition of the individual, 
whether the individual is a direct or indirect victim or perpetrator,28 the 
influence of family members and of others in one’s close social groups, and the 
standing of the individual within these social groups. Some individuals involved 
in group conflict might be eager to take early steps toward conflict resolution, 
whereas others might take months or years longer to be ready to work toward 
resolution. Reluctant members of the group can call on group identity to try to 
discourage resolution efforts by more-eager group members. Dyadic-conflict 
resolution also can be hampered by the individuals’ relationships and alliances 
with third parties who have their own strong views about the nature of the 
conflict and its appropriate resolution. Ken Downes provides the example of 
the sibling who wishes to forgive her brother but is reluctant to take that step 
given the anger and resentment expressed by her other siblings.29 But these 
problems are much more severe in the context of group conflicts, in which it is 
much less clear who in the group does and should own the right to forgive or to 
cease hostilities. 
Individuals are also differently situated with regard to their cognitive 
sophistication regarding the conflict, which means that it is challenging to 
provide effective communication regarding conflict resolution. Individuals with 
high cognitive sophistication are much more likely to pay attention to these 
communications, but their views tend to be highly resistant to change.30 The 
views of those with less cognitive sophistication are more malleable, but these 
individuals are less likely to be attending to communications.31 
The complicated dynamics of group conflicts suggest that they might well be 
harder to resolve than dyadic conflicts. Many of these complications can be 
overcome, however, with effective leadership and sensible conflict-resolution 
procedures. The key for resolving all conflicts is to promote mutual 
understanding. Each side needs to see why the other side cares passionately 
 
 27. Clarke, supra note 21. 
 28. In this issue, Susan Bandes points out in the context of criminal wrongdoing that direct and 
indirect victims are very differently situated. See Bandes, supra note 24. 
 29. Rev. Dr. Kenneth R. Downes, A Reflection and Response to Using Criminal Punishment to 
Serve Both Victim and Social Needs, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227 (Spring 2009). 
 30. James L. Gibson, On Legitimacy Theory and the Effectiveness of Truth Commissions, 72 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 123 (Spring 2009). 
 31. Id. 
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about the issue.32 Because group leaders can strongly influence group members’ 
attitudes, they are essential to promoting a sense of understanding.33 Effective 
leaders will sense an opportunity to promote attitude change and can use 
apology or other reconciliation gestures to invite the opposing group to enter 
into a new relationship.34 Roger Conner and Patricia Jordan point out that 
apology in the context of a group conflict can be effective if (1) the timing is 
right in the sense that negative attitudes have been softened, (2) there is a 
window of opportunity that provides a leader with the ability to confine the 
subject of the apology to a manageable scope, and (3) symbolic communication 
is used to help strengthen the perceived significance of the apology.35 This third 
factor is especially important in the context of group conflicts. To promote a 
harmonious sense of appropriate timing for conflict resolution, the individuals 
in the group may need social markers to guide them through the psychological 
transition, and ceremonies and rituals help to acknowledge endings and new 
beginnings.36 Symbolic gestures, including statues and plaques, also aid healing 
and provide a sense of reparation in situations in which multiple individuals 
suffer from wrongdoing.37 
Brent White points out that leaders might apologize less frequently than 
would be ideal because they are worried about losing face, and that anxiety can 
promote defensive behaviors, including denial, minimization, and mental 
disengagement.38 That sense of face threat can be greater in the context of group 
conflicts because by definition a group will observe the apology. On the other 
hand, if the face threat is perceived as a threat to the group rather than to its 
leader, then it might be relatively easy for the leader to apologize on behalf of 
the group. 
Group conflicts can involve multiple perpetrators and multiple wrongs that 
can have the effect of defining one or both groups in problematic ways. In these 
cases, mechanisms must be designed to address both the individual and the 
broader harms and to provide a symbolic mechanism for the groups to move 
forward with new identities, or at least with a new relationship. As Meir Dan-
Cohen describes the challenge, the goal is to facilitate the loss of collective 
memory (in which personal identities are tangled up in the wrong) while 
retaining a collective history (a more impersonal narrative) of the wrong.39 
 
 32. Clarke, supra note 21. 
 33. Steven D. Martin, Encountering and Countering Tribal Conflict with Film and Dialogue, 72 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (Spring 2009). 
 34. See Conner & Jordan, supra note 18. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Downes, supra note 29. 
 37. See Brent T. White, Saving Face: The Benefits of Not Saying I’m Sorry, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 261 (Spring 2009). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Meir Dan-Cohen, Skirmishes on the Temporal Boundaries of States, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 95 (Spring 2009). 
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In the aftermath of widespread wrongs, individuals are sometimes brought 
to justice using criminal tribunals. The tribunals have the advantage of holding 
wrongdoers accountable, but often they are used to prosecute one or a few and 
highlight the victimization of only one or a few.40 In other cases, truth and 
reconciliation commissions (TRCs) are set up to better understand the 
wrongdoing. TRCs typically provide an opportunity for all victims and 
perpetrators to come forward, but they do so by providing amnesty to those 
who testify, and so accountability is dampened. As Laurel Fletcher notes, 
differing groups within a society might differ in their preferences for criminal 
tribunals or TRCs, and good choices will depend on context, the cultural 
environment, and the timing of redress.41 As the conflicts in the Balkans, 
Rwanda, and Uganda show, identity groups and local politics strongly influence 
people’s reactions to these reconciliation choices. Nevertheless, both of these 
reconciliation mechanisms can promote peaceful coexistence while helping a 
society to create an official history about the past. 
Jill Williams cautions, however, that at some point TRCs can create a 
tension between truth and reconciling a community.42 For example, TRCs are 
set up to enable victims and perpetrators to come forward and testify about 
their activities and experiences. Ideally, a collective history would consist of an 
aggregation of the individual recollections of past wrongdoing. But James 
Gibson expresses his conviction that in order to be truly successful in promoting 
group-conflict resolution, a TRC must focus on the needs of the larger society 
rather than on those of the individual perpetrators and victims.43 Diminishing 
the focus on individuals works better in situations in which, as in South Africa, 
relatively few gross human-rights violations occurred and most people 
aggrieved do not perceive themselves to have been specifically victimized. 
Regardless of perceived focus, TRCs cannot ignore those directly affected by 
conflict, however, because direct victim buy-in is often needed to achieve social 
reconciliation and to ensure that future recommendations are implemented.44 
When societies are cleaved by ethnic or social conflict, effective 
reconciliation is much more likely if the individual members of each of the 
groups involved in the conflict also feel loyalty to the superordinate group. This 
loyalty can be engendered in situations in which the larger group is held 
 
 40. See Donald L. Hafner & Elizabeth B.L. King, Beyond Traditional Notions of Transitional 
Justice: How Trials, Truth Commissions, and Other Tools for Accountability Can and Should Work 
Together, 30 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 91, 91, 95–96 (2007) (noting that international criminal 
tribunals cannot alone accomplish justice because they try only a few cases involving the gravest 
crimes). 
 41. Laurel E. Fletcher, Institutions from Above and Voices from Below: A Comment on Challenges 
to Group-Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51 (Spring 2009). 
 42. Jill E. Williams, Legitimacy and Effectiveness of a Grassroots Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143 (Spring 2009). 
 43. Gibson, supra note 30. 
 44. Williams, supra note 42. 
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together by a common history, ethnicity, and religious and social values.45 As 
Tom Tyler points out, superordinate-group loyalty in very diverse societies can 
be promoted alternatively with procedural justice in general and with regard to 
the conflict at issue.46 Tyler describes procedural justice as including (1) the 
opportunity to state one’s case to authorities, (2) neutral decisionmaking, (3) 
treatment by authorities with dignity and respect, and (4) apparently 
trustworthy behavior on the part of the authorities. Fair procedures help to 
build stronger group identity, and they enhance the legitimacy of the authority 
of the superordinate group. In Tyler’s view, loyalty to the larger group that is 
not otherwise glued together will depend on both identification and legitimacy. 
If this loyalty can be engendered, then individuals will react relationally to the 
decisions of the larger group, meaning that they will accept and comply with 
those decisions simply because the decisions further the concerns of the group. 
If not, then individuals will react instrumentally to the group’s decisions, 
meaning that they will accept and comply with the group’s decisions only when 
the decisions favor their own self-interest. It is much easier to resolve conflicts 
when individuals are thinking relationally rather than instrumentally about their 
relationship to the superordinate group. 
Some but not all group conflicts turn violent. At first blush, it might seem 
that violent conflicts are much harder to resolve, because they are more likely 
to involve atrocities that seem unforgivable, and presumably they are often very 
difficult to resolve. But group conflicts that manage to stay nonviolent typically 
involve groups that are separated geographically, socially, and governmentally 
and involve disagreements with low stakes that in particular do not threaten the 
core identity of any of the involved groups.47 As Bob Mnookin and Alain 
Verbeke point out, sometimes the very factors that keep group conflicts from 
escalating into violence also work to minimize the prospects for reconciliation.48 
When the stakes are relatively low and the groups are not forced to coexist at a 
fundamental level, each side can afford to insist on adherence to its own 
position, and mutual goals do not create pressure for compromise. 
As this introduction indicates, much of the intellectual collaboration 
contained in this conference and this issue focused on identifying the special 
challenges of group conflicts and on exploring a variety of mechanisms that can 
be used to help overcome those challenges. In reaction to this overexuberance, 
some conference participants expressed a concern that group conflicts might 
implicate special ethical issues that counsel against pressing too hard for 
 
 45. See Tom Tyler, Governing Pluralistic Societies, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 187 (Spring 2009). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See, e.g., Robert Mnookin & Alain Verbeke, Persistent Nonviolent Conflict with No 
Reconciliation: The Flemish and Walloons in Belgium, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151 (Spring 2009). 
 48. Id. 
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reconciliation.49 Group-conflict resolution can run the risk of disempowering 
individual victims when community leaders take ownership of the victim’s 
grievance and her power to forgive (or not) her perpetrator. Thomas Brudholm 
and Valérie Rosoux point out that when leaders, in their zeal to promote 
community reconciliation, place undue pressure on direct victims to forgive 
wrongdoing, especially atrocities, those victims can be left feeling lonely, 
abandoned, shameful, fearful, distrusting, and confused.50 And Frank Dukes 
argues that it sometimes makes sense to respect the difference between solving 
problems and healing relationships.51 In some cases the goals of group-conflict 
resolution should be truth, understanding, and reparations rather than apology 
and forgiveness. Dukes worries that in some cases forgiveness can be 
problematic when it has the symbolic effect of mitigating a wrong. These 
concerns could and sometimes should influence both the timing and the 
ultimate goals of conflict-resolution efforts. 
Some of the articles and comments in this issue explore conflict resolution 
issues peculiar to the criminal-justice system. Criminal wrongs involve dyadic 
conflict in that they typically involve actions taken by a perpetrator against a 
victim. But crimes are defined and treated in litigation as wrongs perpetrated 
against the state, and in this sense one side of the dispute involves a group 
(community). When a wrong harms both an individual victim and a group 
(society), it is difficult for a single process to effectively serve the needs of both. 
This was an instinct expressed by James Gibson in his discussion of TRCs, when 
he took the position that a TRC should function ultimately to serve the needs of 
the larger community rather than those of the individual victims.52 The modern 
criminal-justice system seems to take a similar stance toward criminal cases in 
that they serve the needs of the state (the prosecutor) rather than the 
preferences of the victim (who is not a direct party to a criminal case). Victim–
offender mediation (VOM), sometimes used as a substitute for criminal 
prosecution, does a better job of serving the victim’s needs but it fails to address 
social needs. As Maria Mayo Robbins and I argue, the two dispute-resolution 
mechanisms, VOM and criminal trials, can work together to more effectively 
serve the needs of both groups.53 John Haley pushes even harder for criminal-
justice reform by arguing that Japanese-style restorative justice—which involves 
 
 49. E.g., Thomas Brudholm & Valérie Rosoux, The Unforgiving: Reflections on the Resistance to 
Forgiveness After Atrocity, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (Spring 2009); E. Franklin Dukes, Truth, 
Understanding, and Repair, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57 (Spring 2009). 
 50. Brudholm & Rosoux, supra note 49. 
 51. Dukes, supra note 49. 
 52. Gibson, supra note 30. 
 53. Erin Ann O’Hara & Maria Mayo Robbins, Using Criminal Punishment to Serve Both Victim 
and Social Needs, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199 (Spring 2009). 
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mediation by victim, offender, and community representatives—might do an 
even better job simultaneously serving victim and social needs.54 
III 
ARTICLES AND COMMENTS: WHAT WE WROTE 
The eight articles and their accompanying comments were roughly grouped 
into eight topics of discussion at the conference: (1) perspectives on 
polarization, (2) unrightable wrongs?, (3) natural-science insights into conflicts 
and their resolution, (4) philosophical perspectives on conflict and 
transformation, (5) transitioning toward coexistence, (6) reconciling nonviolent 
conflicts, (7) the power of apology, and (8) overcoming resistance to conflict 
resolution. A brief description of the thesis of each of the papers is provided 
below. 
A. Perspectives on Polarization 
In Victims, “Closure,” and the Sociology of Emotion, Susan Bandes 
discusses the polarizing function of victim impact statements (statements by 
victims or family members about the effect of the crime on their lives) used in 
the context of the death penalty.55 The use of victim impact statements is 
justified in order to promote “closure” for the victim, but it is unclear what 
psychological closure can be accomplished from the formal litigation process. 
Even if victim impact statements do help their authors, in the context of the 
death penalty the authors are family members of the victim, not the direct 
victim, and Bandes questions whether it is important to further their interests at 
the expense of the interests of the defendant. In any event, victim impact 
statements are necessarily highly scripted and highly impersonal, and they 
provide no ability for listeners to respond to the authors’ anguish in a 
meaningful way. The only recourse for the jury is to deliver a sentence of death, 
so the statements have the effect of polarizing the conflict in ways that Bandes 
thinks interfere with promoting justice. 
Meghan Clarke, in her comment Polarization: The Role of Emotions in 
Reconciliation Efforts, points out some strategies that have been used in the 
Collaborative Change Approach to group-conflict resolution that are designed 
to help depolarize the competing sides’ stances toward one another.56 In order 
to try to break down the hostility between the groups, Clarke and others bring 
together each identity or stakeholder group in order to share with one another 
why each group cares passionately about the issue. Understanding one 
another’s values and motivations will not resolve the conflict, but it does tend to 
 
 54. John O. Haley, Comment on Using Criminal Punishment to Serve Both Victim and Social 
Needs, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219 (Spring 2009). 
 55. Bandes, supra note 24. 
 56. Clarke, supra note 21. 
     
xii LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 72:i 
 
help aid depolarization. Clarke provides the example of a groundfishery conflict 
that involved recreational fishermen, commercial fishermen, environmentalists, 
researchers, and government officials. The interests of each of these groups 
conflicted, but no group had morally problematic motivations or values, and it 
aided discussions to make that clear at the outset. These meetings can be 
difficult to achieve if hostile attitudes have already set in, because sometimes 
group resentment is so strong that one group does not want to legitimate 
another group by letting it participate in discussions. But the resulting 
depolarization is often critical to constructive resolution of the problem. 
B. Unrightable Wrongs? 
This panel explored the question whether it always makes sense for third-
party advocates to fight hard for depolarization, conflict resolution, and 
forgiveness. In The Unforgiving: Reflections on the Resistance to Forgiveness 
After Atrocity, Thomas Brudholm and Valérie Rosoux question the ethics of 
having religious and political leaders call on individual victims to forgive 
wrongdoing as an aid to group-conflict resolution.57 Even though a group might 
strongly desire political stability and peace, Brudholm and Rosoux argue that 
these goals should not be obtained at the expense of the needs of the victim. In 
addition, Brudholm and Rosoux argue that the future is not per se more 
important than is the past. And, even when the group strongly desires 
reconciliation, reconciliation does not necessarily require forgiveness. The 
authors argue that “the intimate experience and personal pace of each [victim 
and] survivor” should be respected in the process of attempting to build a 
peace.58 
Laurel Fletcher, in Institutions from Above and Voices from Below: A 
Comment on Challenges to Group-Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation, 
challenges the current consensus in the international community that criminal 
tribunals are the best mechanism for rebuilding society.59 To Fletcher, it is not 
clear that a legal response—in the form of a criminal tribunal or TRC—is either 
necessary or desirable for reconciling group conflicts. In the end, Fletcher 
thinks that the appropriate role of the law depends critically on the situation, 
including the cultural identities involved and the timing of the response, and 
that the international community should rethink its rush to aid conflict 
resolution with tribunals and TRCs. 
In Truth, Understanding, and Repair, Frank Dukes explains that his work as 
an environmental advocate and mediator often focuses on environmental 
problems that can be characterized as “unrightable wrongs.”60 In these cases, the 
wrongs involve past injustices that 
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(1) were systematically or intentionally inflicted upon a . . . group, often seemingly 
motivated by prejudice or discrimination; 
(2) have historic, present, and future consequences; 
(3) have come to involve a . . . complex set of issues and stakeholders [complicating 
resolution]; [and] 
(4) have spiritual, moral, emotional, social, economic, and political aspects and 
implications.61 
In these situations Dukes focuses primarily on addressing ongoing 
environmental problems and hazards rather than on mending the relationship. 
Dukes acknowledges that he does focus on helping to build resilient and 
sustainable communities, but he also insists that productive resolution of some 
problems can happen in spite of, even because of, the lack of full reconciliation, 
including forgiveness, in social relationships. 
C. Natural-Science Insights into Conflicts and Their Resolution 
This panel explored the extent to which behavioral biology and 
neuroscience can help us to understand interpersonal conflicts and the 
dynamics of conflict resolution. In A Biological Approach to Understanding 
Resistance to Apology, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation in Group Conflict, 
Douglas Yarn and Gregory Jones note that conflicts between members of an in-
group can be impeded by psychological resistance to apology and forgiveness, 
but that the problems associated with resolving conflict are exacerbated when 
the conflict extends to out-groups or out-group members.62 When conflict 
involves someone from an out-group, there is much less need to preserve the 
benefits of cooperation. In addition, as Yarn and Jones describe, we tend to 
show more fear, distrust, and hostility to out-group members than we do to in-
group members. Yarn and Jones argue that these reactions are evolutionarily 
adaptive but that they nevertheless serve as impediments to group-conflict 
resolution that are not necessarily present in dyadic conflicts. 
In Unlearning Fear of Out-Group Others, Terry Maroney describes a 
neuroscientific fear-extinction study as preliminary evidence supporting the 
notion that out-group hostilities might be influenced by biological 
predispositions.63 In the fear-extinction study, subjects were conditioned to fear 
the presentation of black or white faces with the introduction of an electric 
shock when such faces appeared on a screen. Then the experimenters stopped 
using the shock when that race’s faces appeared on the screen. Subjects’ fear 
was extinguished much more effectively when the subject was conditioned to 
fear faces of individuals of her own race than when the subject was conditioned 
to fear faces of individuals of another race. 
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Steven Martin, in Encountering and Countering Tribal Conflict with Film 
and Dialogue, explores the ability of group leaders to overcome resistance to 
reconciliation in group conflicts, whether innate or otherwise.64 Martin uses an 
example of a group conflict that occurred across religious lines with the pending 
release of a movie titled Theologians Under Hitler. Even if out-group biases 
make group conflicts harder to resolve, offsetting that complication might be a 
predisposition to attend to the views of a respected leader of the in-group. 
D. Philosophical Perspectives on Conflict and Transformation 
What about the philosophical view of group conflicts? To what extent do 
group conflicts differ from individual ones in terms of the normative 
implications of conflict? And how do wrongdoers—individuals and groups—get 
past their wrongdoing? In Skirmishes on the Temporal Boundaries of States, 
Meir Dan-Cohen points out that on the individual level the wrongdoer uses 
apology and remorse to try to redefine herself as a person in such a way that 
others no longer continue to hold her responsible for her prior bad conduct.65 In 
the process of forgiveness, the wrongdoer’s personal identity is redefined in 
such a way that the reactive attitudes of the victim terminate. Dan-Cohen posits 
that a similar redefinition occurs when the wrongdoing is committed by a 
nation. He describes this process as one in which the temporal boundaries of 
the state are redrawn. The end result of such boundary drawing is that the 
collective memory of the wrong (attached to personal identity) is undone while 
the collective history of the wrong (a cognitive recollection that the wrong 
happened) is retained. 
In Comment on Meir Dan-Cohen, Skirmishes on the Temporal Boundaries 
of States, John Goldberg praises Dan-Cohen’s creative thinking about state 
wrongdoing but argues that it is ultimately unclear how a nation gets relieved of 
responsibility for its past harms.66 Equally unclear is why as a normative matter 
nations should be permitted to obtain temporal shifts. Dyadic conflicts that 
redefine the wrongdoer might be easier to envision because the victim is 
empowered to redraw the boundary of the wrongdoer. When a nation commits 
wrong, the justification for redrawing its boundaries often must come from 
somewhere other than a single victim’s forgiveness. 
E. Transitioning Toward Coexistence 
This panel discussed the use of TRCs to transition away from conflict and 
toward peaceful coexistence. In On Legitimacy Theory and the Effectiveness of 
Truth Commissions, James Gibson uses the example of South Africa’s TRC to 
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illustrate the factors necessary to help achieve societal change.67 The TRC needs 
an ability to attract the attention of constituents, which requires a simple 
message containing personal relevance. The TRC needs to be perceived as 
legitimate, which requires that it proceed with impartiality and evenhandedness. 
If perceived as legitimate, then the TRC will be perceived as a credible source 
of information. And information will not help to transform attitudes unless it is 
thought to come from a credible source. The challenge to widespread TRC 
success, according to Gibson, is that people with low cognitive sophistication 
are relatively unwilling to pay attention to the TRC, and those with high 
sophistication, while attentive, are highly resistant to attitudinal change. 
Jill Williams, in Legitimacy and Effectiveness of a Grassroots Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, provides a slightly different perspective on the 
success of TRCs. She describes the TRC process that was put into place in 
Greensboro, North Carolina.68 That process was set up to address community 
hostilities that had been festering for more than twenty years, since the 1979 
killings of black protesters by Ku Klux Klansmen and American Nazis. In that 
case a grassroots-initiated TRC was formed to address the community 
problems, but it was not backed by the local government and it lacked the 
ability to grant amnesty or to subpoena witnesses. Community members had 
very different views regarding the necessity and likely helpfulness of the TRC. 
Williams concludes that in that case, in which local community leaders did not 
play a central supporting and empowering role for the TRC process, truth was 
enhanced but reconciliation was not furthered. Without local government buy-
in, institutional reform was not taken seriously and trust between racial groups 
was not enhanced. 
F. Reconciling Nonviolent Conflicts 
This panel focused on group conflicts that manage not to turn violent and on 
the extent to which their resolution differs from that of violent conflicts. In 
Persistent Nonviolent Conflict with No Reconciliation: The Flemish and 
Walloons in Belgium, Robert Mnookin and Alain Verbeke describe the 
nonviolent but very serious conflict in Belgium between the Flemish (Dutch) of 
the North and the Walloons (French) of the South.69 The Flemish economy is 
more prosperous than the Walloon economy, and the Flemish constitute a 
majority of the Belgian population. Nevertheless, the Walloons enjoy a 
financial subsidy from the Flemish and share equally in the political power of 
the nation due to antimajoritarian restrictions built into the government 
structure. Even though significant and persistent, this conflict remains 
nonviolent due to several factors cited by Mnookin and Verbeke, including 
largely separate geography, language, and social structure; a low-stakes conflict; 
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relatively small wealth disparities; a federal system largely enabling separate 
political systems; and a pragmatic tradition. In this case, the authors argue that 
the disputants can continue to coexist with a civilized separation short of 
divorce. They further point out that the very factors that help keep this conflict 
nonviolent also serve to provide little incentive to work toward a more 
cooperative relationship. 
Tom Tyler is not so sanguine about the ability of the Flemish and the 
Walloons to continue to coexist under the same government structure.70 In 
Governing Pluralistic Societies, he points out that the legitimacy of the Belgian 
government is jeopardized because decisions are often made by the elites to the 
exclusion of the public. When legitimacy is compromised, Tyler argues, citizens 
no longer deal relationally with their government, giving it the benefit of the 
doubt on individual decisions. Instead, citizens begin to evaluate government 
instrumentally based on their own sense of self-interest regarding each policy 
decision. When the citizens deal instrumentally with their government, then the 
government is forced to try to deliver benefits to each of the diverse groups of 
constituents and the stability of the sociopolitical relationship is threatened. 
In Examining the Applicability of the Concepts of Apology, Forgiveness, and 
Reconciliation to Multi-Stakeholder, Collaborative Problem-Solving Processes, 
Jennifer Pratt Miles discusses her efforts to help reconcile a nonviolent group 
conflict in northern New Mexico, where water-quality-improvement issues 
divided watershed groups.71 The ingredients of the conflict-resolution efforts 
were not drastically different here than they would be in other circumstances, 
although perhaps the efforts to resolve nonviolent conflict bear fruit more easily 
than they do elsewhere. Specifically, Pratt Miles pointed out that her conflict-
resolution efforts provided a forum for voice, bearing witness, acknowledging 
the history and past injustices regarding land rights, and incorporating language 
regarding important social values into the documents symbolizing the resolution 
of conflict. 
G. The Power of Apology 
This panel focused on the ways in which the use of the U.S. criminal-justice 
system can conflict with the needs of victims and offenders to come to terms 
with wrongs and to heal from emotional harms. In Using Criminal Punishment 
to Serve Both Victim and Social Needs, Maria Mayo Robbins and I argue that 
our current criminal-justice system could do a better job of simultaneously 
serving the needs of victims and society.72 Currently, criminal wrongs are treated 
as wrongs against the state, and the needs of society are served at the expense of 
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the needs of victims, who are often left feeling frustrated and powerless in the 
process. Robbins and I propose to give victims a more direct voice in the timing 
of parole by allowing them to make an offender eligible for parole ten to twenty 
percent sooner than they would be eligible for parole under governing, default 
rules. Victims who have the power to enable early parole could choose to 
exercise that power as an act of forgiveness toward the offender, or could 
choose not to exercise that power as an act of vengeance; either way the victim 
has a way to give effect to her emotional needs. By so empowering the victim, 
offenders have an incentive to participate in victim–offender mediation, a 
process which has played a significant role in helping victims to heal after 
crimes by promoting understanding, apology, and forgiveness. 
John Haley, in Comment on Using Criminal Punishment to Serve Both 
Victim and Social Needs, argues for even stronger reform of the U.S. criminal-
justice system.73 Haley advocates the adoption of a restorative-justice model 
similar to the one employed in Japan, and he argues that the restorative-justice 
model has proven successful given Japan’s much lower crime and recidivism 
rates. Haley argues that as a normative matter an offender who accepts 
responsibility for her actions, shows remorse, and offers reparations should be 
reintegrated into the community in socially and economically meaningful ways. 
In A Reflection and Response to Using Criminal Punishment to Serve Both 
Victim and Social Needs, Kenneth Downes expresses his support for increased 
victim–offender mediation.74 VOM serves as a quasi-ceremonial process that 
creates a safe space for enabling victims to “restore[] [their own] status and 
voice” and for enabling “the work of apology, forgiveness, and 
reconciliation . . . [to] begin.”75 Downes cautions, however, that policy changes 
will require buy-in from prosecutors, judges, and others in the criminal-justice 
process. These participants all have powerfully formed professional identities, 
and they may therefore need their own group-transition process for VOM to be 
successful. 
H. Overcoming Resistance to Conflict Resolution 
The final conference panel focused on gaining a greater understanding of 
the role of leaders in either contributing to or helping to resolve group conflicts. 
In Never Being Able to Say You’re Sorry: Barriers to Apology by Leaders in 
Group Conflicts, Roger Conner and Patricia Jordan point out that, at least in 
theory, leaders can reap great reputational benefits by successfully diffusing 
group conflict with apology, and yet leaders very rarely offer apologies, either 
on their own behalf or on behalf of the groups they lead.76 Conner and Jordan 
seek to understand why this apologetic behavior gets hindered, and they find 
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three explanations: (1) in many group conflicts, leaders believe that the fault 
lies with the other group(s); (2) leaders or their groups, or both, might privately 
acknowledge wrongdoing but be unwilling to endure the psychological 
transitions required to change their identities and their behavior; and (3) 
apology can be politically risky for the leader. Despite these impediments, 
leaders do sometimes issue public apologies for wrongdoing. Conner and 
Jordan argue that for apology on behalf of a group to be effective, the necessary 
ingredients include (1) ripeness, (2) a window of opportunity (that bounds the 
scope of responsibility), and (3) a symbolic communication for moving forward 
beyond the mere words of the apology. 
In Saving Face: The Benefits of Not Saying I’m Sorry, Brent White adds to 
the list of factors that can hinder apology by leaders.77 He focuses on factors of a 
dispute that tend to trigger feelings of shame on the part of the leader, because 
shame can hinder a leader from standing tall and stepping forward to take 
responsibility. White argues that apology is less likely when the conduct that 
constitutes the wrong is especially blameworthy, when the conduct is harshly 
reproached by the victim, and when the events at issue have already been 
thrown into the public domain. Perhaps for separate reasons, White argues that 
leaders are less likely to apologize when the victim is of low status. In these 
circumstances, White argues that court-ordered forced apologies may be 
necessary to overcome the barriers. 
Alphonse Gerhardstein, in Can Effective Apology Emerge Through 
Litigation?, provides a number of examples in which the factors identified by 
Conner and Jordan—ripeness, a window of opportunity, and a symbolic act or 
gesture—came together to facilitate apology by a public leader.78 But 
Gerhardstein does not think that the window of opportunity needs to be 
exogenously determined. Rather, advocates can, through litigation and 
settlement demands, create that window. Furthermore, Gerhardstein believes 
that apology by public officials can do more to promote a healthy civic society 
than can mere monetary settlement. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
Scholars from several fields have concluded that group conflicts are in many 
ways similar to dyadic conflicts but that group conflicts present their own 
challenges for effective resolution. Group conflicts often require formal 
processes, from public hearings to TRCs to criminal tribunals, and they often 
require the intervention of third-party professionals. But leaders and advocates 
can play an important role in preparing the members of the group to transition 
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from conflict back to peace. The articles and comments in this issue contribute 
in important ways to our understanding of the problem, but they represent only 
the beginning of a rich inquiry. Much more can be learned about these 
dynamics and the role (or lack thereof) of law and legal processes in helping to 
promote conflict resolution. 
 
